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Mechanisms, ceteris paribus laws and covering-law explanation 
Nancy Cartwright, John Pemberton and Sarah Wieten1 
 
 
1. What's in this paper 
 
Mechanisms – stable arrangements of parts that acting together produce novel 
behaviour (behaviour that is not characteristic of any of the parts singly) are all the 
rage now in philosophy of science. They are supposed to provide one of modern 
science’s basic explanatory devices. What do they explain? In 1989 Nancy Cartwright 
introduced the idea of ‘nomological machines’2, which are mechanisms whose 
repeated operation gives rise to regular behaviours of the kind we record in low-
level scientific laws, like Kepler’s laws for the motions of the planets. The 
nomological machine explains the law, which holds ‘ceteris paribus’ – relative to the 
proper operation of the nomological machine.  
 
In his 2012 paper in the Journal of Philosophy, ‘Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal 
Voodoo that Works’3, Michael Strevens adopts the same view, using it to offer a 
semantics for ceteris paribus (cp) laws that defends them from the charge of 
vacuity. Laws with the phrase ceteris paribus in front (like ‘Ceteris paribus, printing 
money causes inflation’) have genuine content, he argues, because the clause 
refers, albeit often without mention, to the mechanism that explains the law. The 
voodoo consists in the fact that the clause, in referring to the mechanism, provides 
content to the cp law even though we do not know much about the mechanism 
referred to, including the features that allow it to generate the behaviour described 
in the law. As Strevens says, ‘[W]hat is intriguing is the possibility that, with the help 
of a familiar Latin expression, we can frame short and simple sentences that entail 
actual event patterns in all their glorious and gory complexity.’4 They do just that on 
the semantics he offers. 
 
All this raises further questions. We shall address three: a question of practical use, 
an epistemological question and an ontological one. In addition, we shall raise 
doubts about Strevens’ Humean programme. 
 
The question of practical use is ‘Of what use are cp laws if we cannot pick out which 
systems satisfy the cp clause?’. The answer, we shall argue, is in the form of markers 
                                                 
1 Nancy Cartwright’s work for this paper is based upon research supported by the National Science Foundation under 
grant no. 1632471 and the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and 
innovation programme (grant agreement no. 667526 K4U), for which she is very grateful. It is acknowledged that the 
content of this work reflects only the authors’ views and that the ERC is not responsible for any use that may be made 
of the information it contains. 
2 Nancy Cartwright, “Where do laws of nature come from”, Dialectica, 51, 65-78, 1997. 
3 Michael Strevens, “Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal Voodoo that Works”, Journal of Philosophy 109, 652–675, 2012. 
4 Ibid, page 5. 
  
and cautions. We can often use the cp law even though we cannot identify features 
of the mechanism relevant to its operation because we learn markers that identify 
systems that afford the relevant behaviour and we also learn cautions about how to 
treat the system so that it will do so much of the time.  
 
The epistemological question is ‘What kind of explanation is involved?’. We shall 
answer, contrary to what many mechanists argue, ‘Old-fashioned covering-law 
explanation.’  
 
The ontological question is ‘What is going on in the world when mechanism M gives 
rise to/generates/affords the behaviour recorded in law L?’.  We shall argue that the 
arrangement of the parts in the mechanism supplies them with features they do not 
possess separately. M gives rise to behaviour B described in L when B is what it 
takes for some set of principles that govern features of M’s parts all to be instanced 
in M’s operation.  
 
There has been some discussion in the literature about what a mechanism is and 
just what its boundaries are. James Woodward, for example, employs an 
‘invariance’ account of what a mechanism is according to which ‘Mechanisms 
consist of parts, the behaviour of which conforms to generalisations that are 
invariant under interventions, and which are modular in the sense that it is possible 
in principle to change the behaviour of one part independently of the others.’5 In 
the medical literature and much of the social science literature,6 by contrast,  
‘mechanism’ usually refers to the sequence of steps in the causal process by which 
the cause produces its effect (where each step may itself be accounted for by some 
underlying powers or causal structure), as in the work of philosopher Daniel Steel 
who  ‘use[s] the term mechanism to refer to regularly operating causal 
relationships’7. Jon Elster’s sense of the term is different yet again. Focusing on 
explanation in the social sciences, Elster develops an account of mechanisms 
designed to fill the explanatory gap between laws and mere description: ‘Roughly 
speaking, mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal 
patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with 
indeterminate consequences. They allow us to explain, but not to predict.’8 Our use 
of the term ‘mechanism’, follows Cartwright’s account of nomological machines, 
                                                 
5 James Woodward, “What Is a Mechanism? A Counterfactual Account” Philosophy of Science Vol. 69, No. S3, S366-
S377, September 2002, abstract. 
6 For a review and criticisms of this ‘intervening variables’ approach to mechanisms in the social sciences, see Derek 
Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process-Tracing Methods. University of Michigan Press, 2016, section 3.3. 
7 Daniel Steel, Across the Boundaries. Oxford University Press, 2008, page 40. 
8 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behaviour, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, page 36; original emphasis. 
Elster mechanisms often come in complementary pairs, which is one reason prediction is difficult. For instance, the 
endowment effect, in which ‘a memory of a good experience is a good memory’ and the ‘experience of a bad [memory] 
is a bad memory’ suggests opposite outcomes to those of the contrast effect, in which memories of past experiences 
have an opposing effect on present experiences. (Ibid, page 56) 
 
  
according roughly with that of the new mechanists.9 For purposes of the discussion 
here, a mechanism is characterised by a set P of parts, in an arrangement A in which 
the parts display a specific set ϒ of features and activities. We shall in our final 
analysis stress the importance of the arrangement for providing the parts with 
features that fall under general principles and thus allow the mechanism to give rise 
to the cp law that it does. A mechanism is a nomological machine if, when operating 
‘without interference’ (a phrase we shall discuss), it gives rise to stable input-output 
relations of the kind typically recorded in causal laws... ceteris paribus causal laws.10 
Throughout, we shall use the terminology of 'nomological machines’ as well as the 
now more standard terminology of ‘mechanism’ to underline this role in affording 
ceteris paribus laws. 
 
To answer the question of practical use, we provide an account of how we learn to 
recognise and use nomological machines. Strevens touches on this question but 
does not aim to deal with it.  He titles his paper ‘Voodoo that works’ because the 
truth conditions he offers for cp laws ‘are typically opaque to the very scientists who 
formulate and test them.’11 So, as he himself says ‘.... this power of ceteris paribus 
hedges may seem to be not only miraculous but useless. What is the practical 
significance of content in a hypothesis unless the investigators know that it is 
there?’.12  We think this is where the real ‘voodoo’ lies. The reference to 
mechanisms is opaque but we can still put our cp claims to good use. We do so by 
learning to recognise markers and cautions. That we can do so is key to much of 
daily and scientific life.  
 
With respect to ontology, note two problematic notions in the characterisation of 
nomological machines: 'give rise to' and 'without interference'. Strevens has 
something to say about both. For 'gives rise to'13, he begins by remarking that the 
behaviours described in cp laws are the ‘consequences’ of the mechanisms.  Later 
he substitutes ‘explains’ and argues that a good scientific model of the mechanism 
will explain, in a perfectly usual sense, the ceteris paribus laws that describe what 
                                                 
9 See e.g. Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl F. Craver. “Thinking about Mechanisms”, Philosophy of science 
67: 1-25, 2000; William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, “Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative”, Studies in the 
History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36: 421-441, 2005; Stuart Glennan, “Rethinking 
Mechanistic Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 69, S342-353, 2002; Phyllis Illari and Jon Williamson. “What is a 
Mechanism? Thinking about Mechanisms across the Sciences”, European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2: 119-135, 
2012.  
10 Following Strevens we shall generally confine our attention to cp causal laws although mechanisms can give rise to 
behaviours described in non-causal laws as well. Also, we shall use ‘laws’ and ‘principles’ interchangeably, depending 
on what is common usage for the ones under discussion; and where there is no danger of confusion, for brevity’s sake, 
we may not always distinguish cp laws from the behaviours they describe. 
11 Strevens (n2), page 1. 
12 Ibid, page 6. 
13 Strevens does use the expression 'gives rise to' but at a different location. He talks of ceteris paribus laws giving rise 
to regularities. 
 
  
happens when it operates regularly.14 But this is not good enough to characterise 
what ‘giving rise to’ consists in and thus to answer our ontological question. 
Explanation is a linguistic enterprise. For the ontology, we need to know what is 
going on in nature between the mechanism and the behaviours, not just what is 
going on in our science (or in an ideal final science) between a model and the cp law. 
Nor does Strevens explicitly claim to treat this latter issue -- he just does not take it 
up. But it is a pressing and, we shall argue, difficult problem that must be addressed. 
Happily, we think we can offer an account that can do the job. Developing this 
account in answer to the ontological question is a main aim of this paper.  
 
A secondary aim is to raise doubts about the success of Strevens' Humean 
programme. Strevens' aim is to introduce mechanisms into the semantics of cp laws 
in order to get them to imply Humean regularities. Cartwright argued in just the 
opposite direction when she introduced nomological machines: regularities 
generated by nomological machines will involve non-Humean features. The issue 
rests on the use of terms like 'enabler' and 'interference' in the statement of these 
claims. Strevens does not address Cartwright’s claims directly, but he does outline a 
demand on scientific modelling that, if fulfillable, would make his case. Strevens 
maintains that the good scientific model gets behind the opaque term 'interference' 
and describes explicitly what must be the case if the mechanism is to operate as 
envisaged to afford the regular behaviour described in the ceteris paribus law. This 
would be terrific if it were so. But we are not so sanguine about this as Strevens. 
Nowhere in our experience of even highly detailed blueprints in physics, we shall 
explain, have we been able to find this happening. This naturally does not show that 
it cannot be done. But it does make it harder to accept that it can. And certainly one 
cannot use this modelling demand as an independent argument that mechanisms 
do generate Humean regularities. 
 
 
2. Strevens’ voodoo  
 
A law claim ought, Strevens assumes, to imply 'its corresponding Humean 
generalization', where the 'corresponding Humean generalization' is 'a precise 
statement of the pattern of events that the law would give rise to.'15 We shall take 
this for granted, except we shall not make Strevens move from cp causal laws to 
Humean regularities but allow instead that there can be genuine causal regularities. 
The problem is that many of the generalisations that are really true are hugely 
complex due to the many ‘enabling conditions’ that must be present and the many 
                                                 
14 Cartwright too has claimed that models can be used to explain these ceteris paribus laws; one of the important ways 
in which models function, she has argued, is as blueprints for the nomological machines that give rise to the regularities 
described by ceteris paribus laws. Nancy Cartwright, “Models: The Blueprints for Laws”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 
64, S292-S303, Dec. 1997. 
15 Strevens (n2) page 1. 
  
‘interferences’ that must be absent, and our law claims are not correspondingly 
complex. The fix is to preface the claim with 'ceteris paribus', so that 'CP, F’s cause 
G’s' expresses the appropriate complex generalisation. It does so because the cp 
clause narrows the scope of the law claim. It does so in three ways. 
 
First, on Stevens account16, the cp clause conditions the law claim to a particular 
mechanism. Strevens says: ‘When a causal hypothesis is framed it is supposed to 
make a claim about a particular contextually determined mechanism: the target 
mechanism.’17 Second, the cp clause also secures reference to the enabling 
conditions that are required for F’s to cause G’s. Third, it is not sufficient that the 
target mechanism be present; it must operate properly. The cp clause secures 
reference to this as well.  
 
So, as the truth condition for ‘CP, F’s cause G’s’ Strevens proposes: 
 
• When condition O holds, then by way of the target mechanism M, the 
conditions Z and the property F bring about the property G. 18 
 
Here Z represents the enabling conditions and ‘O is the set of conditions required 
for the successful operation of M...’ To illustrate with one of Cartwright and John 
Pemberton’s standard examples.19 ‘CP, pressing the lever causes flushing of the 
cistern’ expresses this: ‘If the toilet mechanism operates properly (O), then by way 
of the toilet cistern mechanism (M), pressing the lever (F) when the cistern is full (Z) 
causes flushing (G)’.  
 
The conditions that must fill in for O include, as Stevens agrees, all those interfering 
conditions that might stop the mechanism from affording ‘Fs causes Gs’. Since 
Strevens is interested in talking about cp hedges in terms of Humean regularities, he 
will only want to use language that is ‘respectable’ in a Humean sense. Although 
Strevens’ Humean desires are not central to his claims to be able to turn cp laws 
into true claims, we believe they deserve investigation. So in Section 7 we shall turn 
briefly to his treatment of ‘interference’. There we shall argue that ‘interfering’ 
refers to a causal fact and that there is no way to replace it, as Strevens hopes, by 
items in the Humean mosaic. Beyond that we note that it seems odd that Strevens is 
willing to use the language of ‘enabling’ without comment, since it seems this too 
would be off limits to him as it stands just as is the language of ‘interfering’.  
                                                 
16 Also on Cartwright’s. Note that on neither account is there a suggestion that we must know what the mechanism is – 
that is the point of Strevens’ voodoo. On Stevens’ account, there should be a particular mechanism, not an indefinite 
array. Cartwright is more agnostic, merely claiming that generally there is some mechanism or other.  
17 Ibid, page 9. 
18 We suggest that in Strevens’ formulation, reference to M should appear first since O and Z are M relative.  
19 Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton, “Aristotelian Powers: Without them, What Would Modern Science Do?”, 
Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism, J. Greco and R. Groff. (eds), Routledge, 93-112, 2013, 
Section 2.3.4. 
  
 
Consider now the big advantages of Strevens’ semantics: it allows us to move 
beyond two unemployable conceptions of ceteris paribus hedges, which we call the 
‘Empty’ and the ‘Boring’ accounts. Strevens’ account manages to be both well-
formulated and useful and, in so doing, avoids some of the traditional critiques of 
ceteris paribus hedges. In the Empty account, ‘CP, F’s cause G’s’ says ‘If Ф were to 
obtain, F’s would cause G’s’. Under this account, a cp law is not a claim, rather it is 
an open formula with a dangling variable, since no content is provided for Ф, 
without which this expression cannot have a truth value. In the Boring account, the 
formula is closed, but uninformative. It says ‘conditions Ф, such that if Ф were to 
obtain, F’s would cause G’s’. This account has the benefit that cp laws state 
functioning claims.  Unfortunately, this work-around weakens the claim until it is 
Boring. Of course there is some set of conditions for which, should they hold, F’s 
cause G’s— if the condition F’s do not fail to cause G’s were to obtain, then ‘F’s 
causes G’s’ would be true. The Boring account gives rise to one of the traditional 
concerns about cp hedges: they are vacuous and therefore useless; all they really 
say is ‘F’s cause G’s unless they don’t’.  
 
Strevens formulations avoids these problems by referring to a specific mechanism, 
‘M’ – the toilet cistern – with respect to which the cp claim is supposed to hold, thus 
avoiding the problems of both the Empty and the Boring accounts.20 It can do so 
because, Strevens supposes, the context and practices for the use of cp laws are 
sufficient to secure reference to the intended mechanism.21 Even though the 
identification of the mechanism is less specific than if it were identified by a list of 
the individual properties that make it up, we can still refer to the mechanism, he 
maintains. In contrast with the Empty account then, on Strevens' semantics, the cp 
claim has no free variables,22 and in contrast with the boring account, it has real 
content that could well be – and possibly often is – false.  Thus unlike these other 
two, Strevens’ account has genuine content. And, we add, it is useful content. So 
long as it is possible to identify reliably enough when M obtains and when it doesn’t,    
the ceteris paribus law can be used both for predicting and for making changes in 
the world.  The trick then is in our ability genuinely to refer to a mechanism that 
gives rise to the regular behaviour recorded in the cp law. If we cannot, then 
Strevens account too will be a Boring one, as Julian Reiss warns:23 ‘There is an M (we 
know not what), such that if it were to obtain, Fs would cause Gs.’ Strevens 
maintains that we can do just this, by baptism. For the sake of pursuing our three 
                                                 
20 Or better, ‘mechanism type’. 
21 Much here depends on being able to pinpoint a target mechanism that all/most interested parties have in mind. The 
sociological circumstances that allow for this must be quite interesting. 
22 It seems he must also suppose that in referring to M we also can refer specifically to the M-relative enabling and 
operation conditions it takes for F’s to cause G’s by way of M. 
23 In email correspondence September 2018, Reiss also worries that many cp laws have a vast array of different 
mechanisms. 
  
central questions, we propose to simply accept Strevens’ claim about this, at least 
for a great many cases. We can readily point to the toilet in our bathroom and assert 
that by virtue of this mechanism here, pressing the lever flushes the cistern and also 
to an acorn we hold in our hands, ‘By virtue of the mechanism here, putting this in 
the ground and providing it with warmth, water and light will causes an oak sapling 
to grow.’ 
 
 
3. Of what use are opaque claims? 
 
We and Strevens are in agreement that cp laws depend on mechanisms and that the 
mechanism is often ‘opaque’: we very often do not know what constitutes the 
mechanism nor how it operates. We can refer to it but we don’t know what makes it 
up. Yet people can rely on vast numbers of these mechanism-relative cp laws, in 
scientific practice, in engineering and in our daily lives. How is that possible when 
the mechanism is opaque, when we don’t know what it is that constitutes the 
mechanism we need if the cp behaviour is to obtain?  
 
Strevens tells us about reference but not about use – which is fine for his purposes. 
He is, after all, aiming for a semantics in which a law claim, by virtue of having the 
clause ‘ceteris paribus’ in front, can make a true claim involving reference to 
something that is not mentioned in the claim itself. Still, we might look to his 
discussion of reference for help with the practical problem of use. With respect to 
fixing reference, Strevens notes three conditions that must hold: 
 
First, there must be a well-defined “baptismal group” of exemplars. Second, 
there must be an observer-independent “same mechanism as” relation, that 
is, a criterion for individuating mechanisms that is capable of determining 
facts of the matter about which [systems] do and do not share a certain 
mechanism…Third, a single mechanism must in fact cause the behaviour of all 
or almost all of the members of the baptismal group—it must not be the case 
that there are several different mechanisms, none statistically dominant.24 
 
Unfortunately, these conditions, which are required for the reference of M to be 
fixed, are not very helpful about what it takes for us to be able to fix the reference, 
let alone how we can know when we confront a new system whether it is an M or 
not, even allowing for a degree of uncertainty about this. We might expect an 
elaboration of Strevens’ second criterion to be of more help. About this he says: ‘I 
propose that two phenomena are brought about by the same causal mechanism just 
                                                 
24 Strevens (n2), pages 21-22. 
 
  
in case they have the same causal explanation. The causal facts that matter for the 
purposes of mechanism individuation are, in other words, the explanatorily relevant 
facts.’ 25  
 
The second criterion is supposed to help with the conventional problem generated 
by the first criterion, that a set of exemplars will always have many, many features 
in common, perhaps indefinitely many. Not all are meant to be necessary for a new 
system to fall under the term being introduced. In the context here, M is introduced 
as part of the semantics of a cp law: ‘CP, L’. It is supposed to be L-relative. This 
mirrors Cartwright’s answer to the question, ‘What is a nomological machine for law 
L?’. Her answer: ‘It is a fixed (enough) arrangement of components, or factors, with 
stable (enough) capacities that in the right stable (enough) environment will, with 
repeated operation, give rise to the kind of regular behaviour that we represent in 
[L].’26 For both Strevens and Cartwright, the relevant mechanism is picked out by 
what it takes to get the behaviour described in the law.27 This may work well enough 
for Cartwright’s task, which was to argue that most of the laws we make practical 
use of are not ‘free-standing’ or ‘God-given’, as we may imagine Newton’s or 
Coulomb’s law to be. Rather they hold only on account of special arrangements that 
afford them. It may also work well enough for Strevens’ purposes of fixing 
reference. But it is peculiarly unhelpful in answering the question of what make it 
possible to use these cp laws to guide our expectations in real life. 
 
Our answer depends on a nice empirical fact; nice, that is, for us humans. Systems 
that afford regular behaviours like those recorded in cp laws often come with 
observable, sometimes even fairly precisely measurable, markers: characteristics 
peculiar to them that distinguish them from other, different kinds of systems and 
from mere heaps of parts that do not behave in any systematic ways. So, we can 
make use of many of our cp laws because very often there are markers that pick out 
the right kinds of systems to generate the law-like behaviour they prescribe.  
 
We learn that various features are markers, without knowing why they are. We also 
learn cautions: what might damage the systems that give rise to the behaviour we 
want, or want to avoid, whether they need coddling and how to coddle them, and 
what can make them better at the job. None of this requires us to be able to say 
how the system picked out by the marker does what it does. 
  
                                                 
25 Ibid, page 25. 
26 See Nancy Cartwright, “Where Do Laws of Nature Come From?” Dialectica, Vol. 51, No. 1, 65-78, 1997; Nancy 
Cartwright, The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science, Cambridge University Press, 1999, page 50. 
27 This is explicit in Cartwright’s account: a nomological machine is ‘an arrangement that…gives rise to the kind of 
regular behaviour that we represent in our scientific laws.’ [Ibid, page50.] She notes that for just that reason many will 
find her characterisation of a nomological machine unsatisfying if we want to explain the regular behaviour by 
reference to the machine. 
  
Markers. We can identify that the mechanism is present and at work without any 
knowledge of its internal workings. We rely on the changing length of days between 
summer and winter without need of to understand the movements of the earth that 
are responsible for them. Many mechanisms we construct come with labels that say 
what you can rely on them to do. Many do not need labels. Toasters and computers 
and cars all have a characteristic look. So too with naturally occurring nomological 
machines. It is easy to distinguish nasturtium seeds from acorns even though one 
may have no idea why planting a nasturtium seed produces nasturtium seedlings 
and planting an acorn produces baby oak trees. Moreover, we can use our ability to 
recognise what a nasturtium seed looks like to grow nasturtiums even if nobody 
knows how they work. 
 
Consider a hypothetical example from political science. Two countries are in 
disagreement over a variety of issues, and tensions are mounting. Are they likely to 
go to war? The ‘theory of the democratic peace’, also called the ‘inter-democracy 
non-aggression hypothesis’, gives reason to answer no if they are both 
democracies.28 Roughly: democracies don’t go to war with other democracies. So: 
by way of the target mechanism ‘democracy pair’, even when tensions mount 
between two counties, disagreements will not lead to war.  To the extent that the 
marker ‘democracy pair’ is reliable, it can be useful in planning not only military 
policy but also, for example, international investment policy. There are a variety of 
accounts of just what systemic features might be responsible for the democratic 
peace. But understanding the details of the systems that afford it is not necessary 
for prediction: ‘democracy’ is a relatively easily accessible marker for when non-
aggression is likely. As with much in science, the theory is challenged, and much 
refinement has occurred over the years. Happily, not all the scientific issues matter 
for purposes of prediction.29 On the other hand, getting a good enough 
characterisation of when a country is and is not a democracy is essential if 
‘democracy’ is to provide a policy-useful marker for when to bet against outbreaks 
of aggression.  
 
For a development-centred example, consider what Angus Deaton and Nancy 
Cartwright say about Conditional Cash Transfers (CCTs):  
  
Conditional cash transfers have worked for a variety of different outcomes in 
different places… Think through the causal chain that is required for CCTs 
[such as those incentivising child education and vaccination] to be successful: 
People must like money, they must like (or do not object too much) to their 
                                                 
28 For a philosopher’s discussion of the democratic peace and for further references, see Sharon Crasnow, “The Role of 
Case Studies in Political Science Research”, Philosophy of Science,79(5), 655-66, 2012. 
29 For instance, for purposes of prediction, in this as in most cases, it does not matter whether the association is causal 
or merely a correlation. 
 
  
children being educated and vaccinated, there must exist schools and clinics 
that are close enough and well enough staffed to do their job, and the 
government or agency that is running the scheme must care about the 
wellbeing of families and their children.30  
 
If this is right, finding places where people have a desire for money and they want 
their children to be educated and healthy, as well as finding that the government in 
those places tends to the welfare of its citizens can function as markers for 
identifying where CCTs are likely to initiate the changes desired.  
 
Cautions.  We can learn not only when we have a mechanism of the right kind, we 
can also learn how to recognise when the mechanism is damaged, what to do to 
protect it, and what not to do if we want it to keep working -- as when we 
repeatedly tell teenage children that it's a bad idea to spill Coke on their computer 
keyboard,31 when we don't expect the battery that is oozing a bit of gooey liquid to 
work, or we carry our cell phones outside to hunt reception. Or, we know not to 
bother planting acorns that float after soaking in water for 24 hours. This too 
underwrites the usefulness of our mechanism-relative cp laws. 
 
Although we do learn of many mechanisms how to protect them, it is important to 
underline that nomological machines are often fragile. This is a point that Strevens 
makes as well, using the same example that we often cite:  the Phillips curve 
recording the short-term trade-off between unemployment and inflation. 32 If 
Chicago School economists are right, this cp law arises from an underlying structure 
in which economic agents have expectations that match the true probabilities and in 
which they act to maximise their expected utility. Nobel prize winning Chicago 
School economist Robert Lucas argues that this structure is fragile, and with it the cp 
law it gives rise to. As soon as the government tries to use inflation as a handle to 
affect unemployment, entrepreneurs will recognise inflation for what it is; they will 
not mistake it for a price rise in their domain and will not be moved to expand their 
enterprises, opening new jobs. In its efforts to use the cp law, the government 
breaks the very machine that affords it, or so the Lucas story has it. Once the 
government acts, we have, as Strevens tells us, a new machine.  
 
 
4.  What 'gives rise to' is and isn't 
                                                 
30 Angus Deaton and Nancy Cartwright, “Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Control Trials”, Social 
Science and Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.12.005, 2017, page 10. 
31 To be explicit: ‘If the keyboard does not have Coke dropped on it and otherwise also operates properly (O), then by 
way of the keyboard and computer mechanism, pressing the key marked ‘A’ when the computer is charged up, causes 
‘A’ to appear on the screen.’ The other examples can be reconstructed similarly. 
32 See for instance Nancy Cartwright, “How to do Things with Causes”, Proceedings and addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association., 83 (2), 5-22, 2009. 
  
 
Recall Strevens’ individuation criterion for mechanisms: ‘I propose that two 
phenomena are brought about by the same causal mechanism just in case they have 
the same causal explanation.’ We think the reverse. They have the same causal 
explanation if they are brought about by the same causal mechanism. So we can't 
avoid the question: ‘What is this “brought about by” relation?’. Nor does Strevens' 
own terminology uniformly avoid mention of this relation. He talks for instance 
about states of affairs that a mechanism may or may not cause, about the 
mechanism that causes the pattern of variation recorded in a cp law and about the 
symptoms that a mechanism is responsible for. This section discusses what this 
relation isn't, endorses Carl Craver’s suggestion of constitution as an answer in some 
cases and offers some truth conditions for it of our own but closes by pointing out 
that that does not really remove the puzzle. 
 
 
We talk about M ‘affording’ or ‘giving rise to’ the behaviour B that is described in 
the cp law. This though is not the only terminology in use. For Peter Machamer, 
Lindley Darden and Carl Craver (widely referred to as ‘MDC’), M is ‘productive’ of 
B.33 According to Stuart Glennan, M ‘produces’ B.34 William Bechtel and Adele 
Abrahamsen say that the operation of M is ‘responsible for’ B.35 And Craver and 
James Tabery in their Encyclopedia of Philosophy article, ‘Mechanisms in Science’ 
add ‘underlying’ and ‘maintaining’.36 
 
Independent of what descriptions are used, what are these descriptions supposed 
to represent in the world? There are at least three ways available of treating the 
relation between the mechanism and the causal regularity it gives rise to, and each 
has problems. 
 
Causes 1. First, we might think in terms of the word that slips into Strevens' 
discussion and that is suggested by the terminology of production, causes. This word 
takes on different guises in different circumstances. Here we think it is not helpful. 
In what sense does the operation of a mechanism cause the causal processes it gives 
rise to? How does the nomological machine cause F to cause G; how does, for 
example, the operation of the toilet mechanism cause pressing the flush lever to 
cause the toilet to flush?  Generally, causes should proceed their effects. But the 
operation of the mechanism and the causal process it gives rise to are simultaneous. 
                                                 
33 Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl F. Craver. “Thinking about Mechanisms”, Philosophy of science 67: 1-25, 
2000, page 3. 
34 Stuart Glennan, “Rethinking Mechanistic Explanation”, Philosophy of Science 69, S342-353, 2002, page S344. 
35 William Bechtel and Adele Abrahamsen, “Explanation: A Mechanist Alternative”, Studies in the History and 
Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36: 421-441, 2005, page 423. 
36 Carl Craver and James Tabery, "Mechanisms in Science", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. 
Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/science-mechanisms/,Spring 2017, Section 2.1.1. 
  
Most causal processes are continuous in time and thus have intermediate steps. 
Interrupting these is a conventional strategy for preventing an unwanted effect once 
its cause has occurred. How does that work when the cause is the operation of a 
mechanism and the effect is the causing of G by F?  Also there should generally be a 
flow of influence from cause to effect, which is the basic idea behind conserved-
quantity-interchange accounts of causal processes. Can we identify some influence 
that the operation of the mechanism passes to the causing of G by F?  And often in 
ordinary cases of causation, we can mark the putative cause -- in this case, that 
would be the nomological machine, say the toilet mechanism -- and find the mark 
later on the effect – in this case, the causing of the toilet to flush by pressing the 
lever. None of these conventional characteristics of a causal relation are easy to find 
here. So this does not seem a promising starting idea. As Bechtel and Craver remark 
in discussing top-down and bottom-up causation: ‘…the phrase “top-down 
causation” is often used to describe a perfectly coherent and familiar relationship 
between the activities of wholes and the behaviours of their components, but the 
relationship is not a causal relationship. Likewise, the phrase “bottom-up causation” 
does not, properly speaking, pick out a causal relationship.’37   
 
Causes 2. A second strategy that assumes M plays a proper causal role is to insist 
that the cp law is under specified. A full specification puts the mechanism into the 
antecedent of the law itself: (In O) M and F and Z cause G. Note that this is not the 
same as Strevens' more roundabout formulation of the content of the law claim, 
that by way of the mechanism M, in O, F and Z causes G. But it is the approach that 
Judaea Pearl,38 among others, advocates in his work on causal Bayes nets. But it has 
a wealth of problems. If it is the operation of the machine that M is supposed to 
represent, then F in the antecedent is redundant: if the machine operates, the toilet 
flushes. If it is the parts and their arrangement that M represents, are we to think of 
the parts and the arrangement as a cause? This is what Pearl seems committed to 
since on his proposals M figures into the causal graph and into the causal equations 
in just the same way as F. But if M is a cause, we could expect it fairly regularly to 
have the kinds of characteristic of causes we just described, involving temporal 
priority to the effect, existence of spatial and temporal intermediaries between 
cause and effect and flow of influence. But again, it would take some fancy footwork 
to maintain they are there or explain away the need for them. The use of this 
proposal in Bayes nets faces the additional difficulty that the nodes in a Bayes net 
are supposed to be random variables. That means they have a range of allowed 
values with a probability distribution over them. But what are the allowed values in 
our toilet example? Any structure, dreamt or undreamt of, that has a lever? And 
where can the probabilities over these come from? 
                                                 
37 Carl Craver and William Bechtel, “Top-down Causation without Top-down Causes”, Biology and Philosophy, 
Volume 22, Issue 4, 547–563, 2006, p.547. 
38 Judea Pearl, Causality, Models, Reasoning and Inference (Second edition). Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
  
 
Constitution. This is advocated by Craver. MDC suppose that mechanisms are made 
up of organised entities and activities: ‘Mechanisms are entities and activities 
organised such that they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to 
finish or termination conditions.’39  According to Craver, when the operation of a 
mechanism explains a phenomenon, this ‘variety of explanation is constitutive (or 
componential)’40.  Craver uses the diagram in Figure 1 to represent the connection 
between a phenomenon and its mechanism, stating that: 
 
S’s ψ-ing is explained by the organization of entities {X₁, X₂, …, Xᴍ} and 
activities {φ₁, φ₂, …, φᴍ}41 
 
Where: S is the mechanism as a whole, ψ is the behaviour of S ‘as a whole’, the Xᵢ’s 
are the component entities of S, and φᵢ are the component activities of S (where φᵢ 
is the activity of Xᵢ). 
 
 
Figure 1: Craver’s diagram of a phenomenon and its mechanism42 
 
                                                 
39 Ibid, page 3. 
40 Carl Craver, Explaining the Brain, Clarendon Press Oxford, 2007, page 8. Original italics. 
41 Ibid, page 7. 
42Ibid, page 7, Figure 1.1. 
  
  
Following Craver, we could suppose that the machines parts doing what they do in 
consort constitutes the behaviour described in the cp law. This constitution account 
certainly avoids the difficulties facing causation and it seems that it may work for 
the kinds of cases that Craver often focuses on. In these cases, the phenomenon to 
be explained is the ψ-ing of a system S, and the explanation is the organised 
activities (the φᵢ-ings) of the parts of S at each stage of S’s ψ-ing. The canonical 
example is the neuron transmitting a signal, which on Craver’s account just is, or is 
constituted by, the organised parts (components) of the neuron and their activities, 
especially its membrane and gates and the potassium and sodium ions.  
 
But what about the kinds of cases we have been discussing: ‘CP, Fs cause Gs’ where 
F and perhaps G are frequently not features of the mechanism but instead are 
features of inputs and outputs to it. For instance, putting five quarters in the 
machine and pressing C3 causes a can of Coke to drop out (which is true of a 
vending machine but not of a parking meter). Or, putting bread in the machine and 
pressing the lever causes the bread to toast (which is true of a toaster but not a 
toilet).  
 
It should be no surprise, though, that Craver’s account does not fit these cases well 
since what is to be explained is different. Craver’s examples are ones where S and M 
refer to the same thing and where, as Craver and Tabery put it in the Stanford 
Encyclopedia, ‘The phenomenon [to be explained] is the behaviour of the 
mechanism as a whole.’43 MDC, Bechtel and other mechanists use the details of the 
structure and activities of a system to explain how that system – e.g., the neuron – 
does what it does. Cartwright and Strevens are engaged in a different enterprise. 
They are concerned with the truth of cp laws and with what underwrites their truth. 
In this case the mechanism is employed to explain how something that is not the 
mechanism but a single feature, and often not even a feature of the mechanism – 
an ‘F’ – causes a different feature – a ‘G’ – that may also not be a feature of the 
mechanism.  
 
Consider a typical, well-understood case where a mechanism gives rise to regular 
behaviour of the kind that can be recorded in a cp causal law: Millikan’s famous oil 
drop experiment to measure the charge of the electron. In Millikan’s apparatus, a 
negatively charged oil droplet hovers between two charged plates, pulled down by 
gravity and up by electric attraction. Due to air resistance, it also feels a drag force 
proportional to its velocity. Millikan measured the charge q on the droplet by 
adjusting the potential difference between the plates till the droplet was at rest, so 
he could calculate Felectric  = qE = Fearth⊕ Fdrag.  The charge q is due to free electrons 
on the oil drop, all of which have the same charge qe. Though the drops differ in 
                                                 
43 Craver and Tabery (n24), Section 2.1. 
  
charge, for each drop, q = nqe; so qe can be estimated by measuring q for a number 
of drops. So we have here a well-attested cp law: 
 
Millikan: CP, adjusting the potential difference in the right way causes the oil 
drop to be stationary. 
 
The behaviour in the Millikan cp law is given rise to/generated by/afforded by the 
operation of Millikan’s apparatus: ‘If the Millikan apparatus operates properly (O), 
then by way of this apparatus (M), the behaviour recorded in Millikan will occur. The 
adjusted potential difference pulls up on the drop as does the drag of the air and 
these two forces in the same direction together balance the force of the earth 
pulling the oil drop in the opposite direction. So the oil drop is subject to no force. 
Since F = ma, the oil drop is motionless. 
 
Constitution makes sense in the neuron case and may well be an adequate account 
for many, perhaps even all, of the cases that Craver and others in philosophy of 
biology have in view. Typical synonyms for ‘constitutes’ are ‘amount to’, ‘adds up 
to’, ‘makes up’, ‘composes’ and ‘comprises’. It seems true that the neuron’s parts 
doing what they do amounts to/adds up to/makes up/composes/comprises its 
transmission of a potential difference. It is difficult to see, though, how what is 
recorded in a good description of the parts of Millikan’s apparatus and what they do 
amounts to/adds up to/etc. the potential difference’s causing the oil drop to be 
stationary. So we look for different account that can cover cases like this and that 
may be even be found more informative than constitution even where constitution 
seems to fit. 
 
Here is a suggestion for some truth conditions for our kinds of case that involve 
constitution. Note though that these do not turn the ‘gives rise 
to/generates/affords’ into the constitution relation. We call this the I-MP-O account: 
Input (e.g. F(t)) – Mechanism Process – Output (e.g. G(t’)). 
 
 
I-MP-O.  M gives rise to/generates/affords ‘By way of the target mechanism 
M, given O, the conditions Z and F(t) cause G(t’)’, where F is a feature of a 
system outside M and G may be so as well, if and only if 1) Given Z and O, F(t) 
causes a ‘starting state’ in M, and 2) Given Z and O, that starting state initiates 
a continuous process in M in which each state is caused by previous ones until 
a final state is reached which causes G at t’ (or in which G is instantiated at t’).   
 
This can also double, with simple amendments, for cases where F and G are features 
of parts of the mechanism itself – so long as one is careful about the demand in 
clause 1 that F(t) cause what gets labelled ‘the starting state’. We can use a well-
  
known example of Wesley Salmon44 to illustrate why clause 1 matters. Consider a 
mechanism composed of a rotating beacon in the centre of a stadium with a high 
circular wall. The beacon light can be switched on and off at t. When it is on, a white 
spot sweeps around the wall. Shall we say, CP, A white spot at p causes a white spot 
at p' later?  Surely not. But without clause 1), this cp law is afforded by the 
operation of the beacon mechanism. 
 
Perhaps our quarrel with Craver’s account is just a quibble and our offer of I-MP-O is 
superfluous. Perhaps we should after all accept that the activities of M constitute 
the causing of Gs by Fs. The puzzle seems hardly solved however, neither by Craver’s 
proposal nor by I-MP-O. In the case of I-MP-O, we still want to know what it is about 
the mechanism that allows a trigger of F(t) to initiate a process of change in the 
states of the mechanism that ends in a state in which G(t’) obtains or which causes 
G(t). And in the case of constitution, we still lack an account of why. Whenever it is 
true that x constitutes y, there is a reason that it does so. The kind of reason can 
vary from case to case. What matters is that it is not arbitrary what constitutes 
what, or what kinds of things constitute what other kinds.    
 
At the Board of Examiners meeting, the Chair takes role and announces, ‘We 
constitute a quorum.’ Why do we constitute a quorum? Because ‘we’ includes the 
Chair of the Board of Examiners, the Secretary, all three external examiners and five 
internal members of the Board. That is what the University’s Learning and Teaching 
Handbook says it takes to make a quorum. Later at the meeting you raise your hand 
after a proposal has been discussed. Raising your hand constitutes voting ‘yes’ to 
the proposal. It does so because that’s the convention at the Examiners’ meeting. 
 
Or consider the case of the 17-year-old whose neck was broken when a rugby scrum 
collapsed. Was he right in claiming that the referee’s failure to police the scrum 
constituted a breach of the referee’s duty of care? That’s debatable, and indeed it 
was debated in the British Courts. The young man won the case because, the judge 
found, the referee had not enforced the safety requirements set out in the Laws of 
the Game, which contained special provisions about players under nineteen years 
old, and in particular required front rows to engage in a ‘crouch-touch-pause-
engage’ sequence. The point is that the young man could not just claim that the 
referee’s behaviour constituted a breach of his duty of care; there was, rather, a 
reason that it constituted a breach: the referee is supposed to enforce those safety 
requirements and he did not.45 
 
                                                 
44 Wesley Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University Press, 1984, page 
141. 
45 For a description of this case, see https://www.lawteacher.net/cases/negligence-duty-cases.php. 
  
The reason of course need not be something written in a rule book. It can, for 
example, depend on the kind of thing that is to be constituted and what that thing is 
supposed to do. Why can’t a heap of bricks constitute a fence? Because a fence is 
meant to enclose an area, and a heap of bricks does not do that. ‘David Hume’ does 
not constitute a correct answer to ‘Who wrote The Wealth of Nations?’ because 
Adam Smith, not Hume, wrote Wealth of Nations. The parts in the arrangement 
pictured in the diagram in the design specifications constitute the toaster because 
that’s what makes it up and allows it to do its job. 
 
So, even if the relationship between behaviours in the mechanism and those 
described in the cp law is taken to be constitution, this still leaves a big unanswered 
ontological question, parallel to the one we ask. We ask, ‘What is it for M’s 
operating to give rise to/generate/afford Fs causing Gs?’. If the answer is that M’s 
operating constitutes Fs causing Gs, what is the reason for that?  Why do the joint 
activities of the parts of the mechanism in this particular arrangement constitute 
this particular behaviour? Our last example is the kind we need to think about for 
understanding how mechanisms give rise to cp laws. There the answer seems to be 
that the parts of the toaster behaving as they are designed to constitutes toasting of 
the bread because when they do what they are supposed to, the bread is toasted, 
and there is no more to getting it toasted than letting the parts do their job. This 
answer seems to be a good reason to count the actions of the parts as constituting 
toasting, but the reason still seems incomplete. Why when the parts behave as they 
are supposed to does the bread get toasted? 
 
The answer we shall propose is that what is true of M is that the parts and their 
arrangements call into play different general laws at once and make them combine 
in novel ways they otherwise could not. Although our concern is to discover what 
the relationship between the mechanism and the behaviour described in the cp laws 
is in the world -- that is, relations in the material mode -- we propose to begin the 
hunt in the formal mode, looking at cases where models of mechanisms are used to 
explain cp laws. So we shall next address the epistemological question: ‘In what 
sense does M and its operation explain the behaviours it gives rise to?’. 
 
 
5. Explaining ‘explains’ – the epistemic question answered 
 
Strevens focuses on opaque mechanisms, ones whose workings we do not 
understand and which we may only be able to identify by pointing, since his 
principal aim is argue that this opacity does not make the related cp claim false, 
meaningless, trivially true, or useless. If, on the other hand, we want to find the 
relationships between the mechanism and the cp laws it gives rise to, it is best to 
focus on cases where we know the mechanism and how it operates. 
  
 
Mechanists tend to see mechanistic explanation as very different from covering-law 
explanation. For example, Antti Revonsuo, writing under the title ‘On the Nature of 
Explanation in the Neurosciences’, claims, ‘Explanation in basic neuroscience is a 
prime example of causal-mechanical explanation rather than explanation in terms of 
universal laws and principles.’46 Or consider Craver and Tabery, who title the section 
on explanation in their Stanford Encyclopedia article ‘Mechanisms in Science: From 
Formal Analyses to Material Structures’, where the formal analysis in question is the 
covering-law account. They write: ‘According to [the covering-law model], 
explanations are arguments showing that the event to be explained … was to have 
been expected on the basis of laws of nature and the antecedent and boundary 
conditions …. Mechanists, in contrast, insist explanation is a matter of elucidating 
the causal structures that produce, underlie, or maintain the phenomenon of 
interest.’ 47 They go on to note a number of concerns expressed by mechanists 
about covering-law explanation including:  
 
1. its inability to deal with causal /etiological explanation;  
2. its inability to distinguish re-descriptions of the phenomenon in general terms 
from explanations that reveal the mechanism that produces it;  
3. its possible lack of depth (subsuming a phenomenon under any true law will 
count as a complete explanation so that the level of detail may be insufficient 
for satisfactory explanation);  
4. its requirement for laws which may often be unavailable in the biological and 
special sciences;48 
 
Practicing social scientists are also prone to contrast covering-law and mechanistic 
explanation. For instance, in their classic text Case Studies and Theory Development 
in the Social Sciences49, Alexander George and Andrew Bennett briefly review the 
standard philosophy of science literature and argue that mechanistic explanation 
can solve two problems faced by the deductive-nomological (D-N) account, which 
along with the Inductive-Statistical (I-S) account is the standard formulation of 
covering-law explanation. The first is the problem of distinguishing ‘between causal 
and spurious regularities’50. This problem is akin to 1. above.  The ‘second problem 
with the D-N model is that its predictions must be rendered with perfect certainty’, 
a problem which, they argue following Wesley Salmon, I-S version does not 
                                                 
46 Peter Machamer, Peter McLaughlin and Rick Grush (eds.), Theory & Method in the Neurosciences, University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 2000, page 47. Emphasis added.  
47 Craver and Tabery (n24), Section 3 (first para). Emphasis added. 
48 Ibid, Section 3.1. 
49 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science, MIT Press, 
2004. See also Derek Beach and Rasmus Brun Pedersen, Process Tracing Methods Foundations and Guidelines, The 
University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2013, chapters 3 and 4. 
50 Ibid, page 132. 
  
successfully solve. This adds another to the list of concerns about covering-law vis-à-
vis mechanistic explanation:  
 
         5.   For covering-law explanation, outcomes are supposed to be fixed. 
 
We do not see such a contrast between mechanistic and covering-law explanation. 
We urge rather that the best model for the explanations there, including those for 
nomological machines, is the old covering-law model.51 Standard mechanistic 
explanations are not separate from covering-law explanations but are, rather, a 
subset of them. And a good number of exemplary covering-law explanations are 
equally exemplary mechanistic ones. Kepler's laws are deduced from Newton's laws, 
including the general principle that F=ma and the bridge principle that an object of 
mass m located r from another mass M  experiences a force GMm/r2;  the cp law 
called 'the Phillip's curve' (that in the short term rising inflation reduces 
unemployment) is deduced, as we noted, by Chicago School economists in a 
'rational expectations' model from the general principle that agents act to maximise 
their expected utility and the bridge principle that an entrepreneur's utility in the 
setting modelled is constituted by the firm's profits; the cp law that the rooster flaps 
it's wings, spreads it's feathers, and crows while the three kings above bow to the 
Virgin Mary and Child is deduced in models of the great Three Kings Clock of 
Strasbourg from the law of gravity, the laws of simple machines, and  bridge 
principles that link location on the earth's surface to being subject to the pull of 
gravity, rigid rods resting on fulcrums to levers, inelastic cables passing over free-
turning low-friction wheels to pulleys and so forth. 
 
Perhaps the feeling of contrast results from focusing on a certain simple subspecies 
of covering-law explanations that do not, at least on the face of them, invoke 
mechanisms. For instance: ‘Why does this neuron transmit messages?’. Because: 
‘CP, all neurons transmit messages’. Perhaps the role for the parts and their 
arrangements is not transparent in the description of covering-law explanations, 
since these get lumped under the expression ‘antecedent and boundary conditions’. 
Or perhaps these boundary conditions are conceived of too simply. For instance: to 
explain Kepler’s 1st law, that the planets travel in elliptical orbits with the sun as one 
of the foci, we use Newton’s F = m𝒗
˙
. The boundary conditions include the value of 
m and an initial value of v. Given these we can solve the differential equation to get 
the elliptical orbit. That does not look like a mechanical explanation. But of course, 
                                                 
51 Note that Cartwright (Nancy Cartwright, “Models: The Blueprints for Laws”, Philosophy of Science, Vol. 64, S292-
S303, Dec.1997) too, like Strevens, claims that we use models to explain cp laws. As I.F. da Cunha (2018) explains, 
‘Cartwright differentiates nomological machines from models, which she conceives of as the blueprints of the 
nomological machines. That is, models specify the ceteris paribus conditions that nomological machines must present in 
order to display the behaviour predicted by the laws.’ (Ivan da Cunha, “Constructing Dystopian Experience: A Neurath-
Cartwrightian Approach to the Philosophy of Social Technology”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.05.012, 2018, page 2.) 
  
far more is necessary. We have to fill in F. For that we need to know the structure of 
the mechanism. It is common in presenting this Newtonian explanation to begin 
with a diagram like Figure 2, which pictures a simple nomological machine made of 
just two parts, a large object and a small object, arranged some distance apart. Their 
relevant features are the masses of the two objects, M and m, their separation r, 
and the relative velocity of the small mass with respect to the larger, which has a 
component 𝒓
˙
  along r and r𝜃
˙
 perpendicular to r. Because of the features of the 
objects and their arrangement, the larger one pulls on the smaller with a force 
GMm/r2. Now we can construct a proper, filled-in differential equation. Of course, if 
we start our explanation with that filled-in equation, the role of the parts and their 
features, arrangements and activities will not be apparent. 
 
 
Figure 2: Elliptic orbit of small mass around large mass 
 
 
Objections 1,2 and 3 adumbrated by Craver and Tabery are thus not relevant to our 
thesis. We do not claim that any derivation that satisfies the general covering-law 
demands can do the jobs they call for. But rather, if mechanistic explanations can do 
these jobs, as they argue, then so can covering-law explanations since, we claim, 
standard mechanistic explanations are generally a subspecies of covering-law 
explanations. Nor does objection 5 bear on our claims here for we do not suppose 
that covering laws are all either ‘deterministic’ or statistical. Rather many of the 
central covering laws used in mechanistic explanations are ‘tendency laws’ that tell 
what a cause contributes to the effect, not what overall effect actually happens, as 
  
in the law of gravity, Coulomb’s law and the law describing the drag of the air in the 
Millikan experiment described above.52 This leaves objection 4. 
 
Another reason that others perceive a contrast where, we argue, the correct 
relation is species/sub-species may be due to a doctrine that has often sat alongside 
the covering-law model: that the business of science is discovering general laws. 
That is decidedly not the business that much of biology is in, or so argue Bechtel and 
Robert Richardson 53, who are among the founding fathers of the mechanistic 
account of explanation. Revonsuo provides a neat summary of their view: 
 
Additional support for this view of the nature of biological explanation comes 
from Bechtel (1994), who argues that biological knowledge is not primarily 
represented in universal laws or linguistic structures. Biologists typically first 
identify an interesting system at one level of organization in nature and then 
try to figure out what the components of this system are, how they interact, 
and how they produce the effects that can be observed at the level of the 
whole system. When they go about this task, they try to take the system apart 
or visualize it better with the help of various research instruments in order to 
figure out what the components and microstructures of the system are like. 
From these data biologists attempt to build an idealized model of the system, 
the purpose of which is to show the general structure and function of the 
system. The model may be only partially (if at all) clothed in linguistic 
representations; instead; all kinds of diagrams and figures can often best 
depict the component structures of, and their mutual interactions with, the 
biological system in question…54  
 
We can readily agree with Bechtel and Richardson that the advances in biology they 
note have little to do with the discovery of new general laws and almost everything 
to do with uncovering the structure of systems they have identified as biologically 
interesting. That has no bearing on whether or not general laws play a central role in 
the models biologists construct of how those systems operate to do what they do. 
However the model is presented, with diagrams and figures (analogous perhaps to 
Figure 2), or with equations, or narratives, or whatever, why should we believe that 
structures that match the model can do what they are supposed to? Why is it true 
                                                 
52 For more on tendency laws see, for example, John Stuart Mill, “On the Definition of Political Economy”, The 
Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Volume IV - Essays on Economics and Society Part I, ed John Robson, Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 309-40, 1967; or Nancy Cartwright, Nature’s Capacities and Their Measurement, Oxford 
University Press, 1989, chapter 4. 
53 William Bechtel and Robert Richardson, “Emergent Phenomena and Complex Systems”, Emergence or Reduction? 
Essays in the Prospects of Non-reductive Physicalism, Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr and Jaegwon Kim (eds.), 257-
88, de Gruyter, 1992.   
54 Antti Revonsuo, “On the Nature of Explanation in the Neurosciences”, Theory and Method in the Neurosciences, 
Peter Machamer, Peter McLaughlin & Rick Grush (eds.), University of Pittsburgh Press, 45-69, 2001, page 48. 
  
that the model that pictures just those components in those arrangements explains 
‘the effects that can be observed at the level of the whole system’?  
 
The answer, we propose, is that these effects are just what is to be expected given 
the features of the parts in that arrangement and the covering laws in which these 
features figure. The effects are just what is to be expected because that is what 
must happen if all those features act as they should under the general laws that 
govern them. The trajectory of the oil drop in Millikan’s experiment is different from 
that of the earth going around the sun. But in both cases the masses act in accord 
with the law of gravity. The other features too – like the charge or the resistance of 
the air –also act in accord with the general laws that govern them. Their joint 
actions, in accord with all these general laws at once, explain why the system does 
just what it does. 
 
It may be thought, ‘Yes, but physics examples are the easy ones. It is no surprise that 
physics, with its rich tool-kit of general principles, uses covering laws in its 
mechanistic explanations. What about elsewhere?’. We maintain that physics is not 
special here. Examples of mechanistic covering-law explanations in the socio-
economic sciences, described as such, can be found in Cartwright’s 1995.55 These 
include a money multiplier and a debt-generating mechanism. Here we shall look at 
one of the mechanists’ own favourite examples from biology: signal transmission in 
the neuron. Figure 3 illustrates a few of the parts and stages involved in such 
transmission.  
 
Figure 3: Some steps in signal transmission in a neuron 
 
                                                 
55 Nancy Cartwright, “Ceteris Paribus Laws and Socio-economic Machines”, The Monist, 78 (3):276-294, 1995. 
  
Beginning students are typically told, ‘Signals within neurons are transmitted 
electrically, however signals between neurons are transmitted chemically across the 
synapse’56.  We take it that this means that these signals are transmitted in accord 
with well-known laws of physics and chemistry. Here is the basic mechanistic 
explanation for the electromagnetic transmission in the neuron. 
 
Basic NT explanation: On both the outside and the inside of the neuron sit 
positively charged sodium and potassium ions. In the rest state there is 
somewhat more positive charge on the outside of its membrane than inside, 
so that the voltage measured from the inside is slightly negative. Key features 
of the neuron are sodium-selective and potassium-selective gates in its wall 
which open or close in response to certain stimuli. Arriving neurotransmitter 
particles dock with receptors opening sodium and potassium gates (ligand-
gates), allowing ions to enter the neuron, thus increasing the positive charge 
in the cell and the local voltage across the cell wall. If the voltage passes a 
given threshold, that stimulates an adjacent sodium gate to open; sodium 
ions grouped outside the neuron flood through the open gate due to the 
electro-chemical gradient. The change of charge distribution increases the 
local potential difference across the wall, opening the next adjacent gates. In 
the meantime, the open sodium gates close quickly stopping the rise in 
voltage. The stimulus also opens a slower-to-open potassium gate and 
positively charged potassium ions flow out because the membrane is now 
more negatively charged on the outside than on the inside, so that the 
voltage drops. The potassium gate then closes, and sodium and potassium 
pumps then restore the rest state, so that the process can be repeated with 
the advent of a new stimulus. 
 
There is of course more to be said. For instance, concerning the diffusion forces 
affecting the flow of the sodium and potassium ions. But these too behave as they 
should, according to standard diffusion equations. Or, how do the gates open and 
close? A helical protein string embedded in a pore in the wall of the neuron features 
an uneven charge distribution and is contorted by this potential difference in a way 
that leads to the opening of the passage. Again, this is in accord with what is to be 
expected given the basic laws of electromagnetics – which is not surprising since 
signal transmission across the neuron is modelled electrically. Beyond that, one 
might next explain how the protein is structured that allows it to contort as it does. 
That is likely not to use electromagnetic principles. But for satisfactory explanation it 
should use general principles that hold not just in the proteins in neuron gates, but 
elsewhere as well. 
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Central to the basic NT explanation is Coulomb’s law of electromagnetic attraction 
and repulsion, which played a pivotal role in the Millikan apparatus that we 
described earlier: like charges repel each other and opposites attract. Coulomb’s law 
is even made use of in the same way in the two mechanisms. Millikan shifts the ratio 
of positive to negative charge on the two plates in his apparatus to create a voltage 
difference between them. In the neuron the open gates allow the ratio of positive to 
negative charge on the outside and inside of the membrane to shift thus adjusting 
the voltage difference across it.  
 
But, one might object, this similarity does not dispel the contrast between 
mechanical and covering-law explanation since the explanation of how the oil drop 
comes to a stop in Millikan’s apparatus is itself a mechanistic explanation. We agree. 
It is both mechanical and covering-law. It is the fact that it is covering-law that 
makes it undoubtedly an explanation and not a mere description of what happens. 
We understand why the explanandum behaviour occurs given the structure of the 
mechanism because that is the behaviour that must occur if all the laws we cite, 
which we take to be true, are to be true – and thus not violated in this mechanism.  
 
We do not want to be dictatorial about the term ‘explanation’ though. There may be 
cases both in biology and elsewhere where the features displayed by the parts of a 
mechanism do not obey the general principles inside the mechanism that they do 
outside it. That is one sensible thing one could mean by the claim that the behaviour 
that the mechanism gives rise to is emergent. We do not want to deny that there 
may be emergent behaviour in this sense. Describing what is going on in the 
mechanism when this behaviour occurs is certainly a contribution to knowledge; 
perhaps it is reasonably called ‘explanation’. What we want to stress is that, by far 
and away, most of the satisfying mechanistic explanations available in both natural 
and social science are covering-law explanations.  It is true that some covering-law 
explanations are not mechanistic explanations. The Hodgkin–Huxley formalism 
often cited by mechanists or the differential equations describing transitions 
between neuron states in a Markovian scheme are good examples. But, to repeat, 
that some covering-law explanations are not mechanistic does not show that most 
mechanistic explanations are not covering law. 
 
Supposing we are right that the covering-law model is generally in play in good 
mechanistic explanations. That answers our epistemic question. Does that get us any 
further forward with our ontological one? What is happening, not in our 
representations but in the world? Coulomb’s law helps explain both why adjusting 
the ratio of charges between the two plates causes the oil drops in Millikan’s 
experiment to come to a halt and why the arrival of neurotransmitter particles at 
the front end of a neuron causes the release of neurotransmitter particles at the 
other end. Causes explain their effects, but surely we do not want to claim that 
  
Newton's laws cause Kepler's to be true nor that Coulomb’s causes the cp 
behaviours that the Millikan and neuron mechanisms give rise to.  But if not that, 
then what?  Recall, if we opt for I-MP-O, we still need to know what it is about M 
that means that F(t) starts off a process of changes of state in M that ends in G(t’). 
Or: If you decide the answer should be ‘constitution’, what is the reason that those 
parts acting in just those ways constitute these behaviours?  
 
 
6. The ontological question answered 
 
We can almost read the ontological answer from the epistemic one, and we can see 
it as involving constitution, but not in the way that Craver pictures it. Work a good 
while ago by Adolf Grunbaum57 gives a clue as to how. Newton’s laws explain 
Kepler’s because Kepler's laws are what Newton's amount to in the context of the 
planetary system. In the language of Section 5, the behaviour described in Kepler's 
laws constitutes the obtaining of Newton's laws given the arrangement of the 
planets and the sun. Travelling in the elliptical orbit prescribed by Kepler's laws just 
is what it is for a planet to do what Newton's laws dictate in the presence of the sun. 
So we suggest this condition, which covers not only the behaviours described in cp 
causal laws, which have been our main focus, but can apply for non-causal 
regularities as well: 
 
Affording.  Suppose that behaviour B (e.g. Fs cause Gs) occurs in conditions Z 
and O if mechanism M (characterised by parts P, arrangement A, and features 
ϒ) operates. M = <P,A,ϒ > gives rise to/generates/affords B if, for some ϒ ’⊆ ϒ 
and general principle G(ϒ’) governing features in ϒ’, all the principles in G(ϒ’) 
are instantiated in B’s occurring in Z and O. 
 
Pemberton argues that mechanists tend to pay insufficient attention to 
arrangements.58 Arrangements matter crucially here because they confine how 
general principles are instanced. For example, Towfic Shomar59 models an 
arrangement in which two charges attract each other yet the one moves away from 
the other, and in part on account of that attraction; if it did not, Coulomb’s law 
would be violated in that arrangement. The arrangements play two roles in doing 
so.  
 
First, arrangements introduce new features that parts do not have by themselves. A 
good strong branch, or a shovel, balanced over a rock or a log becomes a lever, 
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which obeys the law of the lever, as levers do wheresoever a lever is found, whether 
with its end wedged under a wheel to heave a car out of the mud or functioning as a 
seesaw in a park. When there is excess charge on one plate compared to the other 
in Millikan’s experiment, there is a potential drop across the plates. A similar but 
different arrangement with some positive charge removed from one plate to the 
other will exhibit a different voltage, sometimes one different in sign, which is what 
happens when excess sodium ions are located inside the neuron membrane rather 
than outside. So, by virtue of the arrangement, new features obtain and new laws 
are called into play, and perhaps others become irrelevant because the features 
they govern disappear from the parts when they are so arranged.  
 
Second, arrangements fix which activities happen when: which happen together and 
which after which. Millikin’s calculation supposes that the pull of the earth, the 
electromagnetic attraction, and the drag of the air all happen at once, which is right 
because the drop is falling through the air, in close vicinity to the earth just while 
the voltage is being adjusted.  In the neuron, the gates nearest the incoming impulse 
open first, then the next ones along, so that the gates open sequentially along the 
length of the axon, which is typically long and thin. One could imagine a different 
shaped membrane with a more symmetric arrangement, which would give rise to 
very different behaviour in the mechanism.  
 
Together this means that the arrangements are crucial to what general laws are 
instantiated in the mechanism and what the behaviour will be when they are all 
instantiated in the same process. This is why arrangements play such a central role 
in mechanistic explanation. But they do so precisely because mechanist 
explanations rely on covering laws.  
 
Return now to the issue of constitution.  Recall Section 5.  We suggested that when 
M gives rise to ‘CP F(t) causes G(t)',  where F is a feature of a system outside M and 
G may be so as well, what is happening is that F(t) causes a ‘starting state’ in M that 
initiates a continuous process in M in which each state is caused by previous ones 
until a final state is reached which causes G at t’ (or in which G is instantiated at t’).  
To this we now add that for these relations to hold among the states of M is what it 
is for the general laws that apply to M's features and their actions all to be instanced 
in this causal process. 
 
 
We suppose that the general laws relevant to the features of the mechanism 
determine the behaviour of its parts (and the parts of the parts, etc.) within each 
arbitrarily short time period. These laws may be   expressible by differential 
equations (such as the force laws of physics; the pushing of one object on another, 
e.g. gas pressure); or laws of heating, compressing (e.g. laws concerning coefficients 
  
of restitution), stretching, distorting, retarding (e.g. laws concerning friction), 
dissolving, diffusing. Other relevant laws may be expressible in qualitative terms, 
e.g. laws governing the cutting of a knife. When the mechanism operates normally, 
these laws obtaining simultaneously for all the parts (and parts of parts) together in 
their given configuration determine the behaviour of the salient parts of the 
mechanism in each arbitrarily short time period and hence the continuous 
behaviour of the mechanism through time. Together they are the reason that the 
initial state causes the final state and hence that the stimulus F that causes the 
starting state can truly be said to cause G later.  
  
Consider again the example of neuron transmission. Here we may take F(t) to be the 
arrival at t of neurotransmitter particles at the head of the neuron and G(t΄) to be 
the triggering of the release of neurotransmitter particles from the synaptic vesicles 
at the end of the neuron. The arrival of neurotransmitter particles (F(t)) causes 
ligand-gated ion channels in the neuron to open. This is part of the starting state of 
the neuron. Other important aspects of the starting state are that the voltage-gated 
channels are closed and there are more potassium ions inside the neuron than 
outside and conversely with sodium ions.  The neuron then exhibits a continuous, 
orderly sequence of states over time, sparked by F(t), crucial among them being 
ones which exhibit a potential difference above the threshold, which will cause the 
first sodium-gated channel to open, which causes later states in which others are 
open, in turn producing a neuron state in which there is a large potential difference. 
So the action potential travels down the neuron’s axon to the presynaptic terminal 
at the end. That in turn causes G(t΄).  
 
Although in Section 6 we focused on Coulomb’s law, in this process we see activities 
in which a number of different well-established general laws are instantiated 
together, for instance: 
 
a) A cloud of particles contained by a wall in which there is a gate which is open 
(closed) can enter (not enter) the gate and cross the wall. 
b) A (net) force on a free-moving particle accelerates/moves it in the direction of 
that force. 
c) A distribution of charges gives rise, via the Coulomb law that we have focused 
on, to forces on local charged particles. 
d) A flexible object subject to differential forces on differing parts contorts. 
 
These general laws are derived from our broader empirical experience, not from our 
study of the neuron. Although these laws are familiar and unremarkable, they are 
central to the operation of the neuron, as to many other mechanisms. These general 
laws apply to the parts of the neuron as follows: 
 
  
• The sodium gate of the neuron allows (prohibits) the passage of sodium ions 
(law a).   
• The being open of the gate is an instance of the contorting of a flexible object 
(law d) (here the flexible object is the helical protein embedded in the sodium 
gate).  
• The sodium ions are (i) the local charged particles subject to a force (law c), 
(ii) the free-moving particles (law b), (iii) the members of cloud of particles 
that enter (do not enter) the gate (law a) and (iv) components of the 
distribution of charges (law c). 
 
We see that, during each arbitrarily short period of time, the pertinent general laws 
being true together of the neuron’s parts in their given arrangement at that stage 
determines the behaviour of the parts and hence the mechanism as a whole at that 
stage and thereby the obtaining of an orderly sequence of states over time.  
 
 
7. Doubts about Strevens’ Humean programme 
 
A mechanism recall is characterised by a set of parts P, an arrangement A and set of 
features ϒ.  According to Strevens, ‘CP Fs cause Gs’ is to be rendered as ‘When 
conditions O hold, then by way of the target mechanism M, conditions Z and the 
property F bring about G, where O is the set of conditions required for the 
successful operation of M.’  We maintain that what ‘conditions O hold’ means in this 
formula when more fully expressed is this: ‘Nothing affects the outcome G other 
than F and Z and the activities of the parts P in arrangement A by virtue of the 
features in ϒ’. If we are correct then Strevens’ Humean hopes are dashed. He may 
replace ‘Fs cause Gs’ by ‘Gs follow Fs’ but that will not render the cp law free of 
causal notions.  
 
Apart from the fact that you may think our claim false, it may also seem unduly 
complicated. We put it this way because the activities of the parts due to features in 
ϒ may be sufficient to ensure G, but G may not occur if their effect on G is offset 
either by factors outside M or by other features of the parts not in the set ϒ (all the 
while preserving A). After all, anything that satisfies the characterisation is an M 
even if it has, as any real system inevitably must, a good many further features as 
well.  
  
As to the correctness of our claim, recall that Strevens puts a lot of stock in the good 
scientific model of the mechanism. It will tell us how to fill in O. Models though can 
be deceptive. A result you wish to obtain holds with deductive certainty in a well-
understood model employing well-confirmed principles. We build a device that 
satisfies the exact specifications of the model and set it running. But we do not get 
  
what we want. Why? Because the parts in reality have more features, indefinitely 
many more, than pictured in the model, there is more to the arrangement than is 
represented, and the whole thing operates in an environment that may have all the 
features built into Z but many more that were nor represented at all. 
 
Though we can frequently solve this problem in practice, the problem does not go 
away in principle by building more and more comprehensive models. We can 
imagine a contest – ‘The Engineer’s Challenge’. The first contestant proposes a 
model in which it follows that Fs cause Gs, specifying what the essential Humean 
features and arrangements for it are. The only restriction is that these specifications 
must have genuine empirical content to prevent descriptions equivalent to ‘and 
nothing else that matters to the production of G’. For instance, if the specification is 
that the total force on an object is φ, this must be replaced by descriptions of 
empirical sources of forces that add up to φ. The second contestant must then 
construct another model in which all those specifications are satisfied but in which 
‘Fs cause Gs’ is not derivable. Then back to the first engineer to try again, who can 
either add more details or scrap that model and offer another. Our claim is that the 
first contestant should never win, no matter how clever they are, for there is always 
a way for the second to thwart what is offered.  
 
Why believe our claim? Primarily because that’s what the experience of the 
‘cussedness of machines’ shows. But also, why not? One reason would be if we 
granted that we live in a world made up of a finite number of fixed features so that 
it makes sense to talk of a ‘complete’ description that specifies the value of every 
quantity and quality in the world. Then the first contestant could use that in their 
model. But it does not seem that we live in such a world. And failing that, we see no 
good arguments to counter the cussedness assumption we draw from experience. If 
so, there’s no getting around the need to use causal concepts to fill in the semantics 
for cp laws. 
 
 
  
